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INTRODUCTION: THE SPIRITED REVOLUTION 
 
 
“Today was in the hands of the ultimate court; The Court of Public Opinion and 
in it I got an answer to my Question; Our IPA’s TM has limits.” 
–Tony Magee, Founder of Lagunitas Brewing Company1 
 
American beer, wine, and spirits have come a long way since the dry days of 
Prohibition and the Great Depression.  Indeed, from 1920 till close to the turn of 
the twenty-first century, the alcoholic beverage landscape in the United States 
was bleak and bland.  What was once a 2,783 brewery industry in 1915 shrank to 
a mere 684 breweries in 19402; and by the 1970s, Anheuser-Busch alone 
accounted for as much as one-fourth of all beer sold in the United States (U.S.), 
while over-two thirds of beer was produced by the top ten breweries in the 
country.3  Wine, too, took almost half a century after the Twenty-First 
Amendment was passed to recover its pre-Prohibition success.4  And in 1960 
Fortune magazine ran an article that forebodingly declared, “No one writes 
happily about liquor.”5 
Now, the alcoholic beverage industry is in the midst of a revolution.  In 1970 
there were only four hundred wineries in America, but today there are more than 
seven thousand, and America has surpassed France and Italy as the world’s top 
wine market.6  The beer business, in particular, is booming: there were 3,464 
breweries in 2014 (not counting the seventeen hundred new ones planned for 
2015), and beer production has doubled to over twenty-five million barrels a 
year.7  Domestic and foreign breweries are being purchased for billions of dollars 
as small brewers race to attract the attention of investors, while the biggest 
producers compete to partner with the most popular craft breweries.8  The spirits 
industry is poised to replicate the same rejuvenated success of wine and beer9—
 
1 LagunitasT (@lagunitasT), TWITTER (Jan. 13, 2015, 8:15 PM), https://twitter.com/lagunitasT/status/ 
555216638643933184 [hereinafter Magee Twitter]. 
2 TOM ACITELLI, THE AUDACITY OF HOPS 6–7 (2013). 
3
 Id. at 28–29. 
4 Mary Orlin, The Legacy of Prohibition on Wine 80 Years Later, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-orlin/the-legacy-of-prohibition_b_4385186.html. 
5 Shelley DuBois, The New United States of Booze, FORTUNE (Feb. 19, 2013), http://fortune.com/ 
2013/02/19/the-new-united-states-of-booze/. 
6 Wine Revolution: As Drinkers and Growers, U.S. Declares Independence, NPR (Mar. 16, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2013/03/16/174431437/wine-revolution-as-drinkers-and-growers-u-s-
declares-independence. 
7 Michael D. Kanach & Daniel J. Christopherson, Trademarks in the Golden Age of Craft Beer, 
LANDSLIDE (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/landslide/2015-16/november-december/trade 
marks_the_golden_age_craft_beer.html. 
8 See, e.g., Tripp Mickle, Heineken Buys 50% Stake in Lagunitas Brewing, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Sep. 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/heineken-buys-50-stake-in-lagunitas-brewing-
1441744398; John Kell, Anheuser-Busch is on a Craft Beer Bender, FORTUNE (Sep. 23, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/09/23/anheuser-busch-golden-road (on Anheuser-Busch’s purchase of Golden 
Road Brewery in Los Angeles); Chad Bray & Michael J. de la Merced, Anheuser-Busch InBev and 
SABMiller to Join, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/business/dealbook/ 
anheuser-busch-inbev-sabmiller-beer-merger.html; Jennifer Kaplan, Constellation to Buy Ballast Point 
Brewing for $1 Billion, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2015-11-16/constellation-to-acquire-ballast-point-brewery-for-1-billion. 
9 Chris Morris, Craft Distilleries: The Next Local Liquor Boom?, FORTUNE (Aug. 1, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/08/01/distilleries-craft-beer-liquor/. 
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Kentucky, for example, now has more barrels of bourbon than people living in the 
state.10 
But just as America is “in the golden age for craft beer” and spirits, so are we 
in a golden age of legal disputes—especially those involving trademark, unfair 
competition, and consumer information.11  The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), for example, had to approve over five thousand new 
trademarks in 2015 alone, and producers are doing everything they can to protect 
their brands.12  Interestingly, brewers are finding that, even after filing for 
trademark recognition with the USPTO, their trademarks’ protections are not 
infinite.  Lagunitas Brewing Company, for example, had to back down from suing 
Sierra Nevada Brewing Company for infringing on their “IPA” (Indian pale ale) 
text because of the public backlash against the lawsuit.13  Indeed, Lagunitas’ 
founder, Tony Magee, famously declared on Twitter his realization that “[o]ur 
IPA’s TM [trademark] has limits.”14 
Trademark issues with the USPTO are not the only legal challenges facing 
liquor producers.  To sell in interstate commerce, brewers, distillers, and vintners 
need their products’ labels to be approved by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and 
Trade Bureau (TTB). The TTB has to review an overwhelming number of 
applications:  it approved 17,773 labels for beer alone in 2014,15 and has to 
review several hundred thousand applications in total each year.16  The TTB, in 
approving these labels, must ensure that information contained in them is not 
misleading.17   
Yet recently, consumers have brought several lawsuits claiming that the 
labels are misleading.18  Producers have increasingly countered that when a 
federal agency such as the TTB approves their labels, they should have a “safe 
harbor” from such lawsuits.  As we shall see below, however, the courts are not 
so sure.  If producers like Tony Magee are finding that their beverage trademarks 
have limits, they are similarly finding that the label approvals they get from the 
 
10 Fred Minnick, Bourbon Boom Sets Record, fredminnick.com (May 18, 2016), http://www.fredminn 
ick.com/2016/05/18/bourbon-boom-sets-records/. 
11 Kanach & Christopherson, supra note 7. 
12 See generally, David Kluft, A Trademark Year in Wine and Beer 2015: Our Holiday Buyer’s Guide 
to Disputed Beverages, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW BLOG (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.trademarkand 
copyrightlawblog.com/2015/12/a-trademark-year-in-wine-and-beer-2015-our-holiday-buyers-guide-to-
disputed-beverages (listing well over one hundred trademark disputes in the alcoholic beverage industry 
during the 2015 calendar year). 
13 Id. 
14 Magee Twitter, supra note 1. 
15 Kanach & Christopherson, supra note 7. 
16 Robert C. Lehrman, Judge Miller Not Too Impressed with TTB System or Tito Approvals, 
LEHRMAN BEVERAGE LAW: BEVLOG (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.bevlaw.com/bevlog/vodka/judge-miller-
not-too-impressed-with-ttb-system-or-tito. 
17 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2015) (the TTB, in reviewing these labels, must “prohibit deception of the 
consumer” and “provide the consumer with adequate information as to the identity and quality of the 
products”) (emphasis added). 
18 See, e.g., Beck’s Beer Settlement Includes Payouts for up to 1.7m U.S. Households, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/oct/20/becks-beer-settlement-payout-
germany-st-louis [hereinafter Beck’s Beer Settlement] (Anheuser-Busch claimed that Beck’s beer is 
“German” when it is in fact brewed in St. Louis, Missouri); Harry Bradford, If You Bought Kirin Beer in 
the Last 5 Years, You Could Get $12, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2015/01/07/kirin-beer-money_n_6430732.html (Anheuser-Busch claimed that Kirin is “Japanese” 
when it is in fact brewed in America). 
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TTB have limits as well. 
This Note examines the TTB’s label review process and the judicial split 
regarding the “safe harbor” doctrine in the context of alcoholic beverage labels.  
This Note observes that the judicial split is a result of the tension between two 
conflicting priorities stemming from the TTB’s purpose and identity:  on one 
hand, courts want to defer to the TTB as a federal agency enforcing federal law, 
but on the other hand, courts aim to uphold the central purpose of the Federal 
Alcohol Administration (FAA) Act—protecting consumers from misinformation.  
Ultimately, this Note argues that the latter position is correct:  by refraining from 
deferring to the TTB simply because it is a federal agency, courts can hold the 
TTB and producers more accountable for providing consumers with accurate 
information. 
First, I shall assess the procedures and purposes of the TTB’s label approval 
process: I will examine the role of various players in the alcoholic beverage 
regulatory regime—including Congress, the TTB, the states, and the courts—and 
analyze the TTB’s relation to U.S. trademark law and European appellations law.  
Second, I shall examine prominent cases in recent years that grapple with the 
“safe harbor” defense raised by producers being sued for deceptive claims on 
their labels.  Third, I offer some practical solutions for the courts, TTB, and 
producers of the alcoholic beverage industry moving forward. 
 
 
I.  THE REGULATION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LABELS: A DISTILLED SUMMARY 
 
A.  The Role of Congress: Where the TTB Derives its Legal Authority 
 
The TTB derives its regulatory authority from Congress.  After the repeal of 
Prohibition in 1933 by the Twenty-First Amendment,19 Congress passed and 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Federal Alcohol Administration 
(FAA) Act20 in 1935, which generally governs the labeling of alcoholic 
beverages.21  Congress charged the Secretary of Treasury, who has overseen 
taxation of such commodities as alcohol since 1789,22 with promulgating 
regulations to put the FAA Act into effect.23  The Secretary of Treasury, in turn, 
delegated this duty to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
(ATF).24  After the Homeland Security Act reorganized the ATF, the Secretary of 
Treasury delegated FAA rule-making authority to the TTB.25  The TTB, 
 
19 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XXI. 
20 27 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2015).  The Supreme Court also declined to declare the FAA Act 
unconstitutional and valid.  See Julia Lynn Titolo, Note, A Trademark Holder’s Hangover: Reconciling The 
Lanham Act with the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau’s System of Designating American 
Viticultural Areas, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 173, 185 (Fall 2009) (citing William Jameson & Co. v. 
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939)). 
21 Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, No. CV 14-09670 AB (ASx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at *7–
8 (C.D. Cal., June 3, 2015). 
22 The TTB Story, ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX & TRADE BUREAU, http://www.ttb.gov/about/history. 
shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2017). 
23 27 U.S.C. § 202(h). 
24 Cruz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at *8; Titolo, supra note 20, at 186.  See also 27 U.S.C. § 
202(h). 
25 Cruz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at *8 (citing 6 U.S.C. §§ 203, 212(a)(1)). 
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therefore, is now the primary federal regulatory authority that oversees spirits, 
wines, beer, and their labels (as well as tobacco products, firearms, and 
ammunition).26 
The three central purposes of the FAA Act—which are, therefore, the central 
purposes of the TTB —are to “ensure the integrity of the industry” by issuing, 
suspending, and revoking permits; to “protect consumers” by requiring producers 
to have a Certificate of Label Approval (COLA) and by ensuring that the 
information on the labels is accurate; and to “preclude unfair trade practice.”27  
The FAA Act requires the TTB to promulgate labeling and packaging regulations 
for producers of alcoholic beverages.28  These labeling regulations must 
particularly focus on prohibiting “deception of the consumer” and providing “the 
consumer with adequate information.”29 
 
B. The Role of the TTB: How the TTB Regulates Labels 
 
The TTB’s regulation of labels are found in Title 27 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, Chapter I, Subchapter A.  Part 4 prescribes label regulations for 
wine, Part 5 prescribes label regulations for distilled spirits, Part 7 prescribes 
label regulations for beer and malt beverages, and Part 13 describes the 
requirements for label proceedings.  The regulations police any label statement 
“that is false or untrue in any particular, or that, irrespective of falsity, directly, or 
by ambiguity, omission, or inference, or by the addition of irrelevant, scientific or 
technical matter, tends to create a misleading impression.”30  In prohibiting 
misleading statements, the TTB refrains from forbidding statements that are 
considered “mere puffery,” which are “[s]ubjective, unverifiable claims” distinct 
from “specific, quantifiable statements of fact that refer to a product’s absolute 
characteristics.”31 
The TTB enforces its regulations mainly by requiring alcohol labels to have a 
COLA.32  The TTB requires any producer of alcoholic beverages who sells in 
 
26 Statutory Authority and Responsibilities, ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX & TRADE BUREAU, 
http://www.ttb.gov/about/stat_auth.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2017) [hereinafter TTB Statutory Authority].  
There was some initial conflict about whether the FAA Act or the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
should have jurisdiction over alcoholic beverages since the purpose of both acts is to ensure that 
information represented on labels of products to be consumed is accurate and not misleading.  However, 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) never appealed when the 1976 Brown-Forman case held that 
“Congress intended to grant exclusive jurisdiction over alcoholic beverage labeling to the ATF when it 
enacted the FAA,” and the ATF and now the TTB has regulated alcoholic beverage labels since.  See Cruz, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at *8–9 (citing Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. v. Mathews, 435 F. Supp. 5 
(W.D. Ky. 1976)). 
27 TTB Statutory Authority, supra note 26. 
28 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2015).   
29 Id.   
30 27 C.F.R. § 5.42 (2016) (prohibited practices for liquor labels).  See also 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.39 (2016) 
(prohibited practices for wine labels), 7.29 (prohibited practices for beer labels). 
31 Marty v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (internal quotes 
omitted).  See also Parent v. MillerCoors LLC, No. 3:15-cv-1204-GPC-WVG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
145071, at *23–24 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015) (citing Vitt v. Apple Computer, Inc., 469 Fed.Appx. 605, 607 
(9th Cir. 2012) (affirming the finding that descriptors . . . were “generalized, non-actionable puffery because 
they are inherently vague and generalized terms and not factual representations that a given standard has 
been met”) (internal quotes omitted). 
32 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.50 (for wine), 5.55 (for liquor), 7.41 (for beer) (2016). 
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more than one state to get a COLA for a particular bottle or can before selling it.33  
Before issuing a COLA, the TTB evaluates and preapproves an alcohol label to 
ensure it contains all mandatory information and contains no prohibited 
information.34  The TTB protects the integrity of its COLAs through field 
investigators35 and procedures that allow consumers to file complaints,36 amongst 
other methods.  If the TTB determines that a producer has misused a particular 
COLA, the TTB may revoke the COLA.37 
There is a distinct difference between TTB “Regulations”38—that is, what is 
found in Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations—and TTB “Rulings”39—
that is, the policy statements written by the TTB that help interpret and apply the 
Regulations.  In short, the Regulations are the legal requirements that the TTB 
must actually enforce under the FAA Act; whereas the Rulings are simply the 
TTB’s guideposts for helping members of the alcohol industry follow the 
Regulations.   
In Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch,40 the plaintiff complained that Anheuser-Busch 
(AB) misled customers by placing the Bud Light (emphasis added) logo on a case 
of Lime-R-Rita cans, since the calorie-packed Lime-R-Rita was allegedly 
anything but “light”; AB countered that TTB Ruling 2004-1 permitted the use of 
the word “light” so long as nutrition content was listed on the can, and not 
necessarily on the outer packaging.41  In holding for AB, the court declined to 
give the TTB Ruling “the force of law,” and instead relied upon the COLA that 
the TTB granted to AB’s Lime-R-Rita packaging.  The court reasoned that the 
TTB’s authority to issue COLAs is found in the Code of Federal Regulations, 
whereas Ruling 2004-1 is not.42  As we shall see below, however, not all courts 
are satisfied that they should accept the COLA as having a force of law just 
because the Code of Federal Regulations allows the TTB to grant them. 
 
C.  The Role of the States: “Safe Harbor” for Practices Permitted Under  
Federal Law  
 
Several states have safe harbor provisions that protect conduct permitted by 
federal law.  Florida, for example, protects “[a]n act or practice required or 
 
33 See 27 C.F.R. §13.21 (2016) (application for a COLA).  Producers who distribute within their own 
states only, and who therefore do not sell in interstate commerce, are not bound by the TTB’s COLA 
requirement.  See Kanach & Christopherson, supra note 7 (citing TTB Ruling 2013-1 (Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://www.ttb.gov/rulings/2013-1.pdf). 
34 Pye v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 4:14cv493-RH/CAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128594, at *8–9 
(N.D. Fla. Sep. 23, 2015). 
35 Id.  
36 Hofmann v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 14-cv-2569 JM (JLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65398, at *2 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015).  See 27 C.F.R. § 13.62 (2016) (allowing third party comments on COLAs). 
37 27 C.F.R. § 13.41 (2016). 
38 See U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFF., ELECTRONIC CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, http://www.ecfr.gov/ 
cgi-bin/text-idx?c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title27/27tab_02.tpl (last visited Jan. 26, 2017). 
39 See TTB Rulings, ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, http://www.ttb.gov/rulings/ 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2017). 
40 Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, No. CV 14-09670 AB (ASx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027 (C.D. 
Cal., June 3, 2015). 
41 Id. at *2–4, *13–14.  See also ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX & TRADE BUREAU, TTB RULING 2004-1 
(2004) [hereinafter TTB RULING 2004-1] 
42 Id. at *16–17. 
2017 Mercurio: “Safe Harbor” on the Rocks 113 
specifically permitted by federal or state law.”43  Illinois immunizes parties if they 
are doing something “specifically authorized by laws administered by any 
regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this State or the 
United States.”44  New York offers a “complete defense” to an act or practice that 
“complies with the rules and regulations of . . . any official department, division, 
commission, or agency of the United States.”45  States do not need to have 
explicit statutory provisions to provide safe harbors, either:  the California 
Supreme Court, for example, has recognized the safe harbor defense despite the 
lack of a statutory provision.46 
The key question is whether the TTB’s actions, by virtue of the fact that 
Congress has specifically authorized the TTB to regulate alcohol, have the effect 
and force of federal law.  Courts have attempted to resolve this question. 
 
D. The Role of the Courts: How Much Do Courts Defer to the TTB’s COLAs? 
 
Courts will give “broad deference” to a federal agency’s actions so long as 
they meet the requirements of the Supreme Court’s 1984 ruling in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.47  Chevron held that if 
courts ascertain “that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, 
that intention is the law and must be given effect”48; and so if Congress intended 
to empower agency actions to have the force of federal law, then courts should 
intervene only when the agency has exceeded the authority Congress intended to 
give it.49   
In 2001, United States v. Mead Corp.50 expanded upon the requirements 
necessary to trigger Chevron deference for federal agencies:  agency action could 
have the “effect of law” only when the agency “provides for a relatively formal 
administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that 
should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”51  The Administrative Procedure 
Act ensures this fairness and deliberation by requiring agencies to allow the 
public to participate in the rule-making procedure.52  In Mead, the Court held that 
 
43 FLA. STAT. § 501.212(1) (LexisNexis 2017). 
44 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 505/10b(1) (LexisNexis 2017). 
45 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(d) (LexisNexis 2017). 
46 Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 973 P.2d 527, 541 (Cal. 
1999) (“Specific legislation may limit the judiciary’s power to declare conduct unfair.  If the Legislature 
has permitted certain conduct or considered a situation and concluded no action should lie, courts may not 
override that determination.”). 
47 Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, No. CV 14-09670 AB (ASx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at 
*15–16 (C.D. Cal., June 3, 2015) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
48 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
49 Cruz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at *15–16. 
50 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).   
51 Id. at 230.  See also Von Koenig v. Snapple Bev. Co., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1076 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 
(demanding a “formal, deliberative process akin to notice and comment rule-making or adjudicative 
enforcement action” before giving the FDA’s policy the rule of law). 
52 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2015) (“After notice required by this section, 
the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission 
of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”).  See also Von 
Koenig v. Snapple Bev. Co., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1076 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (demanding a “formal, 
deliberative process akin to notice and comment rulemaking or adjudicative enforcement action” before 
giving the FDA’s policy the rule of law). 
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the United States Customs Service’s rulings “were not entitled to Chevron 
deference because the agency did not ‘generally engage in notice-and-comment 
practice’ when issuing its rulings.”53  Some courts have ruled that the “relatively 
formal administrative procedures” should involve a “hearing with trial-type 
procedures,”54 whereas others have ruled that they should require the same 
circumstances required for federal preemption.55 
When alcoholic beverage producers are sued for consumer deception on their 
labels, they may raise the defense, under certain states’ safe harbor provisions, 
that their labels were approved by the TTB.  These producers argue that because 
Congress intended to give broad authority to the TTB to regulate beverage labels, 
courts should apply Chevron deference to the TTB’s actions—particularly, its 
grant of COLAs.  As we shall see later, some courts agree, and some courts do 
not:  it depends on whether or not those courts are satisfied that the TTB’s actions 
are accompanied by the “formal administrative procedure[s]” required under 
Mead, and whether the TTB’s label approval process truly prohibits deception of 
consumers and provides consumers with adequate information under the FAA. 
In January 2017, as this Note goes to print, the U.S. House of Representatives 
passed the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, which proposes to eliminate 
Chevron deference to federal agencies.56  It remains to be seen whether the Senate 
and President Donald Trump will also approve of the bill.  Whatever the result, 
the bill indicates the growing distrust of Chevron deference. 
 
E. The Relationship of COLAs to U.S. Trademark and EU Appellations 
 
Although a full comparison of the TTB, U.S. trademark law, and European 
Union (EU) appellations law is beyond the scope of this Note, it is helpful to 
briefly assess their relationship to each other to help understand the purpose of the 
TTB.  The FAA Act governs the TTB,57 the Lanham Act governs the USPTO,58 
and various international treaties, especially the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS), help 
protect geographic indications (GIs) and regional appellations.59 
At first glance, it seems that the TTB is not at all in conflict with either 
USPTO or European appellation law.  After all, the FAA Act, from which the 
TTB derives its authority, instructs the TTB to prevent consumer deception 
specifically related to use of someone else’s “trade or brand name”60—the 
domain of U.S. trademark law—and, moreover, includes a provision that 
recognizes trademark law’s first-to-use doctrine.61  Likewise, the TTB is 
 
53 Hofmann v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 14-cv-2569 JM (JLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65398, at 
*17 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015) (citing Mead at 218-19). 
54 Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
55 Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2015). 
56 Michael Macagnone, House Passes Bill Ending Chevron Deference, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/879235/house-passes-bill-ending-chevron-deference. 
57 27 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2015). 
58 15 U.S.C. § 1501–1141n (2015). 
59 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
60 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2015) (emphasis added). 
61 Id. (“nothing herein . . . shall deny the right of any person to use any trade name or brand . . . not 
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responsible for designating and policing American Viticultural Areas (AVAs), 
which, like European appellations, protects the integrity of regional boundaries 
and the wine produced in that region.62 
Yet despite the similarities, the “standards are often not as similar as they 
appear.”63  Although both the TTB and USPTO prohibit applications for obscene, 
indecent, or scandalous statements,64 for example, it seems that the TTB has a 
higher tolerance for “obscene” statements on labels than the USPTO does for 
trademarks.65  Similarly, the USPTO is not concerned with prohibiting the use of 
spirit terms on their beer marks, whereas the TTB is,66 and while the TTB’s 
regulations state that the TTB will prohibit deceptive use of other brands, it “will 
certainly not take time to investigate whether a brand used on a label is owned by 
a competitor.”67  Indeed, sometimes the TTB’s rulings have adversely affected 
trademark rights—particularly when it comes to AVAs68—and one author has 
noted that it is unclear to what extent the TTB “has embraced the Lanham Act 
provisions in its regulatory guidelines.”69 
The reason for the underlying conflict is that, although the FAA Act, the 
Lanham Act, and the TRIPS Agreement have overlapping concerns—namely, the 
protection of producers from unfair competition and the protection of consumers 
from misinformation and deception70—they emphasize different focuses in 
achieving their similar goals.  Ultimately, trademark law and appellation law’s 
primary concern is protecting producers (which has the secondary effect of 
protecting consumers from misinformation), whereas the TTB chiefly aims to 
protect consumers (although by protecting consumers, the TTB has the secondary 
 
effectively registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office which has been used by such person 
or predecessors . . . for a period of at least five years last past”) (emphasis added).  U.S. trademark law has 
adopted a first-to-use doctrine, meaning that regardless of whether a holder has registered the mark or not, 
the law will protect the first user of the mark.  See Deborah J. Kemp & Lynn M. Forsythe, Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications: A Case of California Champagne, 10 CHAPMAN L. REV. 257, 263 (2006). 
62 27 C.F.R. § 4.25 (2016) (appellations of origin).  European GI’s focus on protecting the products 
associated with a particular locale or territory.  See Kemp & Forsythe, supra note 61, at 281–82.  
Interestingly, the TTB regulations on geographic indications on wine labels are quite strict:  85% of the 
grapes must come from the AVA indicated on the label, see 27 C.F.R. § 4.25(e)(3)(ii) (2016), whereas 
there are no similarly strict regulations for geographic indicators on beer.  Perhaps that is why breweries 
such as Anheuser-Busch have been able to advertise Beck’s and Kirin Ichiban beer as “German” and 
“Japanese,” respectively, even though both are actually brewed in America.  See Beck’s Beer Settlement, 
supra note 18; Bradford, supra, note 18. 
63 Kanach & Christopherson, supra note 7. 
64 Compare 27 C.F.R. § 7.29(a)(3) (2016) with 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2015) (section 2 of the Lanham 
Act). 
65 Kanach & Christopherson, supra note 7.  The TTB approved a label that stated “F*CK ART LET’S 
DANCE!” (censorship added), when there is “little doubt that the USPTO would refuse an application for 
that brand under §2(a) [of the Lanham Act].”   
66 27 C.F.R. § 7.29(a)(7) (2016).  This creates the “likely scenario where a brewery smartly secures 
early rights in a brand through an intent-to-use trademark application, only to learn months or years down 
the road that the brand cannot be used on a . . . label” under TTB regulations.  Kanach & Christopherson, 
supra note 7. 
67 Kanach & Christopherson, supra note 7. 
68 Titolo, supra note 20, at 175 (noting that when the TTB recognizes a new AVA, it appropriates 
existing trademark rights). 
69 Kemp & Forsythe, supra note 61, at 270–71. 
70 Compare 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (the FAA Act) (“prohibit deception of the consumer” and “provide the 
consumer with adequate information”) with 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2015) (the Lanham Act) (“protect . . . 
against unfair competition” and “prevent fraud and deception in . . . commerce”) and with TRIPS, supra 
note 59, at art. 22(2)–(3) (“prevent: the use of any means . . .  which misleads the public as to the 
geographic origin of the good”). 
116 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 7:2 
effect of protecting producers’ brands, as well). 
The FAA and Lanham Acts, and the regulations promulgated by the TTB and 
USPTO, demonstrate the different emphases that the TTB and USPTO have.  The 
Lanham Act’s statement of intent focuses largely on the producer:  it seeks to 
protect those who have registered their marks, to prevent unfair competition, and 
to prevent fraudulent or misleading use of marks.71  There is no mention of 
customers or consumers; the emphasis is on protecting the producer who registers 
his mark.  The FAA Act’s regulations of labeling, on the other hand, focus 
squarely on the consumer:  it seeks to “prohibit deception of the consumer” and 
“provide the consumer with adequate information.”72  Although the FAA Act’s 
labeling protocols seeks to protect producer’s brand names, it does so expressly to 
“prevent deception of the consumer”73—emphasis on the consumer.  Similarly, 
although the Lanham Act is concerned with the “likelihood of confusion among 
consumers,”74 trademark law applies the test of whether a reasonable consumer 
would be confused only when it is determining whether a producer’s mark is 
worthy of protection75—emphasis on the producer.  U.S. trademark law’s first-to-
use doctrine holds that producer’s marks are protectable without registration so 
long as the producer has started using it; the main point of trademark registration, 
therefore, is to “give constructive notice to” competing producers that producer’s 
mark is valid and protectable.76  The main point of TTB label registration, on the 
other hand, is to make sure producers are providing the customer with accurate 
information.77  We see, then, that although the regulations for trademark 
registration and TTB label registration achieve the similar goals of protecting 
producers and consumers, the USPTO’s main focus is on protecting the 
producer’s mark, whereas the TTB’s main focus is on protecting the consumer 
from misinformation. 
European appellation law, even more so than U.S. trademark law, emphasizes 
protection of the producer of alcohol, regardless of the customer information.  
Article 22 of the TRIPS Agreement generally prohibits the use of GIs when they 
“mislead the public or amount to unfair competition,”78 but Article 23 holds that, 
for wine and spirits in particular, there is no need to consider whether use of a GI 
misleads the public or not.  In other words, Article 23 states that alcoholic 
beverages should never use a GI unless it is actually from that region,79 although 
TRIPS does offer some exceptional protections for terms that were already in use 
 
71 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2015).  The point of trademark law is to avoid confusion about the product’s 
source and producer.  See Kemp & Forsythe, supra note 61, at 263–64; Titolo, supra note 20, at 179. 
72 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2015) (emphases added). 
73 Id. 
74 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2015). 
75 Id. § 1052(d) (2015) (forbidding registration for a mark that is likely “to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive”); Id. at § 1114 (2015) (placing the burden on the producer to argue that his 
mark should be protected). 
76 Kemp & Forsythe, supra note 61, at 263. 
77 In re Anhesuer-Busch Beer Labeling Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 1:13 MD 2448, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 76005, at *35–36 (N.D. Oh. June 2, 2014) (“The TTB has stated that the purpose of the 
labeling regulations is to ensure that consumers are provided with adequate information to inform their 
purchase of malt beverages.”) (citing 27 U.S.C. § 205(f); 27 C.F.R. §7.29(a)(1)). 
78 TRIPS, supra note 59 at art. 22(2)–(3). 
79 Id. at art. 23. 
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as generic terms or were already protected by trademark.80  So, words such as 
“champagne,” “feta,” and “bourbon” should not be used to describe products 
unless they are actually from the Champagne wine region in France, from certain 
regions in Greece, or from Bourbon County in Kentucky.81  The European 
argument for GI protection is that producers need to protect the meaning and 
renown of their GI’s from being watered down82:  that is why when the Institut 
National des Appellations d’Origine (INAO)83 approves the use of GIs, it 
ascertains that the wine not only is from the geographic region but also meets the 
expected production standards of that region.84  When the USPTO indicates 
geographic region with certification marks, on the other hand, it is concerned only 
with whether a product is actually from the region indicated on the product, and is 
not required to certify that the product has met those region’s production 
standards or conditions.85 
Although European appellation law might be of some benefit to consumers—
under a strict TRIPS Article 23 regime, customers will be able to know that their 
champagne comes from Champagne, France, and not from the Carneros AVA of 
Napa Valley, for example—the fact is that overemphasis on protecting 
appellations overwhelmingly protects regions and the producers within them, 
without much concern for whether consumers have correctly identified 
information about the product or not. 
In 2004 a brewery from Budvar, a region in the Czech Republic, famously 
sought to prohibit Anheuser-Busch from selling beer under the “Budweiser” 
name, since Anheuser-Busch produced beer at several international locations, and 
not in Budvar.86  The Budvar brewery relied upon European appellation law in its 
argument.  The WTO, in what is now referred to as the “Budweiser Ruling,” held 
against the Budvar brewery and reasoned, in part, that “Budweiser” had become a 
term that consumers did not associate with the Budvar region.87  Had the WTO 
ruled otherwise, all the power and influence would go to the producer, with little 
left over for consumers. 
The FAA Act, the Lanham Act, and European appellations law have similar 
goals and effects—the protection of producers from unfair competition, and the 
protection of consumers from misinformation—but they have different focuses.  
In contrasting the FAA Act with the Lanham Act and European appellations law, 
we see that the chief purpose and concern of the FAA Act, and therefore of the 
TTB, is the protection of consumers from misinformation and misleading claims.  
Keeping this purpose in mind has influenced the way courts have ruled on the 
 
80 Id. at art. 24(5). 
81 See generally Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About 
Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 299 (2006). 
82 Id. at 308–09 (citing Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], Paris, Dec. 15, 1993, 1994 
E.C.C. 385 (when the perfumer Yves St. Laurent called one of its perfumes “Champagne,” it usurped the 
prestige of the appellation). 
83 The INAO is the French government’s committee on geographic indications for wine.  Id. at 307–
08. 
84 Id. (citing CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L. 721-
1 (ensuring that a geographic indication meets the region’s standard expectations for quality and 
characteristics)).   
85 Id. at 309–10 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(C)–(D)).   
86 See generally CAROL ROBERTSON, THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF WINE LAW 147–59 (2008). 
87 Id. at 158 (citing Ruling by the Panel, WT/DS174/R/15 (Mar. 2005)). 
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validity of TTB COLAs. 
 
 
II. BEER, SPIRITS, AND THE CASES THEY COME IN: THE JUDICIAL SPLIT ON  
“SAFE HARBOR” 
 
A. Overview: The Tension of Two Conflicting Priorities 
 
Section I of this Note introduced two key characteristics of the TTB:  first, its 
identity as an administrative agency authorized to promulgate federal regulations, 
and second, its purpose of protecting consumers from misinformation.  In the past 
three years alone, several lawsuits have been brought against beer and spirits 
producers regarding misleading statements on their TTB-approved labels and 
packaging.  Many of these producers have increasingly raised the “safe harbor” 
defense—that is, because the TTB, a federal regulatory agency, approved the 
labels, the producer’s claims on those labels are legal.  Remarkably, courts have 
more or less split evenly on the question of whether the safe harbor defense 
succeeds or not. 
The reason for the split is the tension between the two central characteristics 
of the TTB:  its identity as a federal agency and its purpose of protecting 
consumers.  Some courts emphasize the former and defer to the TTB’s label 
approval process; these courts allow a safe harbor.  Other courts emphasize the 
TTB’s purpose and show skepticism for the TTB’s label approvals; these courts 
refuse to recognize a safe harbor defense. 
Cases involving Tito’s Handmade Vodka indicates just how fractured the 
courts are on the safe harbor defense.  Fifth Generation, a spirits producer, has 
been sued by no less than eleven plaintiffs on the same issue:  that Tito’s 
Handmade Vodka is made not by hand, but by machine, and therefore the 
“handmade” claim on the label—which was approved by the TTB—is deceptive 
at worst and misleading at best.88  Yet courts from different jurisdictions have 
approached the safe harbor defense differently:  in the Northern District of Illinois 
and the Northern District of Florida, the courts recognize safe harbor,89 but the 
Southern District of California and the Northern District of New York are too 
skeptical of the TTB approval process—the same process with which the Illinois 
and Florida district courts had no problem, apparently—to grant safe harbor.90 
In re Anheuser-Busch Beer Labeling Mktg.91 is a good illustration of the two 
conflicting concerns regarding a safe harbor (even though the case does not 
mention the safe harbor defense at length).  In that case, the plaintiffs complained 
 
88 See generally Robert C. Lehrman, Tito’s Scorecard, LEHRMAN BEVERAGE LAW: BEVLOG (Dec. 1, 
2015), http://www.bevlaw.com/bevlog/vodka/titos-scorecard. 
89 Pye v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 4:14cv493-RH/CAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128594 (N.D. Fla., 
Sept. 23, 2015); Aliano v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 14 C 10086, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128104 (N.D. 
Ill., Sept. 24, 2015). 
90 Hofmann v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 4:14cv493-RH/CAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65398 (S.D. 
Cal. Mar. 18, 2015); Singleton v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-474 (BKS/TWD), 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14000 (N.D.N.Y., Jan. 12, 2016). 
91 In re Anhesuer-Busch Beer Labeling Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 1:13 MD 2448, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 76005 (N.D. Oh. June 2, 2014). 
2017 Mercurio: “Safe Harbor” on the Rocks 119 
that the alcohol-by-volume (ABV) percentage stated on Anheuser-Busch products 
was incorrect.92  Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that the TTB’s rule, which 
allowed a 0.3% deviation for ABV percentages stated on product labels, should 
be invalidated because such a rule went against the TTB’s purpose of ensuring 
that label information was as accurate as possible for the benefit of potential 
customers.93  In ruling for Anheuser-Busch, the court stated that it should defer to 
the TTB’s label approval process:  “Whether or not this Court agrees . . . , 
Congress entrusted the TTB with broad discretion in this area [i.e., the labeling of 
alcoholic beverages] and courts should be extremely reluctant to invalidate a 
policy determination.”94  At the same time, the court also reasoned that “the true 
focus of these regulations is to provide the consumer with adequate information 
. . . concerning the identity and quality of the product, [and] the alcoholic content 
thereof.”95  In other words, the court was concerned with whether the TTB was 
fulfilling its purpose of providing customers with accurate product information, 
and ultimately found that a 0.3% deviation in the stated ABV percentages was not 
impermissibly misleading to consumers.  In re Anheuser-Busch, then, highlights 
the tension between the court’s relationship with the TTB and its label approval 
process:  on one hand, courts want to defer to the TTB’s authority as a federal 
agency; on the other hand, courts want to ensure that the TTB stay true to its 
purpose of providing consumers with accurate information and protection from 
deception. 
Although we will momentarily discuss the two different lines of cases in 
detail, the Figure below presents a chronological list of court rulings on the safe 
harbor issue.  
 
 
FIGURE – CHART OF RECENT “SAFE HARBOR” CASES 
 
CASE COURT LABEL 
DISPUTE 
“SAFE HARBOR” RULING AND 
REASONING; CURRENT STATUS OF 
THE CASE 








Complaint dismissed (June 2014).  The 
court does not discuss a “safe harbor” 
defense at length but recognizes it.  The 
court defers to the TTB’s label regulations, 
which must comply with the TTB’s purpose 





S.D. Fla. “German” Motion to dismiss granted/denied in part 
(Sept. 2014).  There is NO safe harbor, 
because the producer did not use the label 
that was actually approved by the TTB.  
Cased settled in May 2015. 
 
92 Id. at *6–7. 
93 Id. at *41–42.  The plaintiffs rely on 27 C.F.R. §7.29(a)(1) (2016) (TTB must prohibit “any 
statement that is false or untrue in any particular, or that, irrespective of falsity . . . tends to create a 
misleading impression”) and 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2015) (TTB must ensure  that labels ‘provide the 
consumer with adequate information” and are not “likely to mislead the consumer.”). 
94 Id. at *36. 
95 Id. at *43 (citing 27 U.S.C. § 205(f) (2015)). 





C.D. Cal. “Bud-Lite” Complaint dismissed (June 2015).  There 
IS safe harbor, because courts should defer 
to the TTB’s regulations, especially when 





S.D. Cal. “Handcrafted” Complaint dismissed (August 2015).  There 
is NO safe harbor.  The court does not 
defer to the TTB when it is not clear the 
TTB confirmed the veracity of claims on 
the label.  However, the complaint was 
dismissed on other grounds. 
Tito’s Vodka 
(Pye v. Fifth 
Generation) 
N.D. Fla. “Handmade,” 
“made in an 
old fashioned 
pot still” 
Motion to dismiss granted/denied in part 
(Sept. 2015).  There IS safe harbor, 
because courts should defer to the TTB’s 
regulations.  Motion for Summary 
Judgment granted on September 2016.   
Tito’s Vodka 
(Aliano v. Fifth 
Generation) 
N.D. Ill. “Handmade,” 
“made in an 
old fashioned 
pot still” 
Complaint dismissed (Sept. 2015).  There 
IS safe harbor, because courts should defer 
to the TTB’s regulations. 
Blue Moon Beer 
(Parent v. 
MillerCoors) 





Complaint dismissed (Oct. 2015).  There IS 
safe harbor because courts should defer to 




era v. Fifth 
Generation) 
S.D. Cal. “Handmade,” 
“made in an 
old fashioned 
pot still” 
Motion to dismiss denied (Nov. 2015).  
There is NO safe harbor.  The court does 
not defer to the TTB when it is not clear the 
TTB confirmed the veracity of claims on 
the label.  Joint Motion to Dismiss was 








“made in an 
old fashioned 
pot still” 
Motion to dismiss granted/denied in part 
(Jan. 2016).  There is NO safe harbor.  
The court does not defer to the TTB when it 
is not clear the TTB confirmed the veracity 
of claims on the label.  Court ordered 
mandatory mediation in February 2016. 
 
B. Cases Emphasizing Deference to the TTB as a Federal Agency 
 
As we shall see, two Tito’s Handmade Vodka cases, Aliano v. Fifth 
Generation96 and Pye,97 have come down on the side of deferring to the TTB, as 
have Cruz98—which involves Anheuser-Busch’s Lime-R-Rita brand—and 
Parent99—which involves MillerCoors’ Blue Moon.  Aliano v. Fifth Generation 
and Pye represent the far end of the judicial spectrum, which calls for courts to 
defer automatically to the TTB’s decisions, no matter the circumstance.  Cruz and 
Parent also prefer to defer to the TTB, although they appear to do so only after 
they are satisfied that the TTB had sufficient rules and regulations that supported 
its decisions to grant COLAs to certain products. 
 
96 No. 14 C 10086, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128104 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 24, 2015). 
97 Pye v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 4:14cv493-RH/CAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128594 (N.D. Fla., 
Sept. 23, 2015). 
98 Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, No. CV 14-09670 AB (ASx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027 (C.D. 
Cal. June 3, 2015). 
99 Parent v. MillerCoors, LLC., No. 3: 15-cv-1204-GPC-WVG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145071 (S.D. 
Cal. Oct. 26, 2015). 
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The general complaint against Fifth Generation, Inc. (FGI), who produces 
Tito’s Handmade Vodka, is that Tito’s label states the that vodka is “handmade” 
and “crafted in an old fashioned pot still,” and that, moreover, Tito’s website 
makes similar misleading claims.100  The Plaintiffs have claimed that such 
statements are misleading and false because “handmade” implies that the product 
is “made by hand” or at least “made from scratch or in small units,”101 when in 
fact the vodka is “mass-produced in large quantities from commercially 
manufactured neutral grain spirits that are trucked and pumped into the Tito’s 
facility and distilled in modern, technologically advanced stills.”102  FGI has 
raised the safe harbor defense in each of these lawsuits. 
 
1. Aliano v. Fifth Generation (N.D. Ill.) 
 
Aliano v. Fifth Generation epitomizes the view that courts should defer to the 
TTB:  the court was so confident in the TTB’s label approval process that it did 
not even consider for itself whether FGI’s label claims were misleading, and ruled 
for FGI in a relatively brief opinion.  The court hung its hat on the COLA that the 
TTB granted to Tito’s.  Because COLA procedures required that “TTB 
representatives personally inspected the manufacturing process at [FGI],” and 
because the TTB “has repeatedly approved Tito’s label as truthful and 
appropriate,” the court ruled that the COLA, which has been “specifically 
authorized by the TTB, as a regulatory body,” precluded the plaintiffs from 
successfully accusing Tito’s of deceptive label claims.103 
The court in Aliano v. Fifth Generation, however, did not respond to two key 
arguments made by the plaintiffs.  First, the plaintiffs, acknowledging that the 
COLA provided safe harbor for approved labels, suggested that the certificate of 
label approval should not also provide safe harbor for misleading statements on a 
website. 104  Second, the plaintiffs also argued that, in any case, the safe harbor 
defense should be “inapplicable . . . , because there is no legislation that 
specifically authorizes the conduct alleged”105—in other words, although courts 
should, under Chevron and Mead, defer to legislation, they are not always bound 
to defer to agency action such as label approvals.  This second argument, as we 
shall see, has led many other courts to deny the safe harbor defense. 
 
2. Pye v. Fifth Generation (N.D. Fla.) 
 
Pye is slightly more nuanced than Aliano v. Fifth Generation in that Pye 
 
100 Aliano, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128104, at *1–2; Pye, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128594, at *1.  See 
also Hofmann v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 14-cv-2569 JM (JLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65398, at *2–4 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015); Singleton v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-474 (BKS/TWD), 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14000, at *2–4 (N.D.N.Y., Jan. 12, 2016). 
101 See, e.g., Pye, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128594, at *5–6.  See generally TITO’S HANDMADE VODKA, 
http://www.titosvodka.com/ (last visited February 25, 2016). 
102 See, e.g., Hofmann, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65398, at *3–4.  The plaintiff in Hofmann cited, in 
particular, a 2013 Forbes magazine article that described Tito’s “massive buildings containing ten floor-to-
ceiling stills and bottling 500 cases an hour.”  Id. 
103 Aliano, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128104, at *11–12 (internal quotations removed). 
104 Id. at *11. 
105 Id. at *10–11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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actually did acknowledge that the label claims could be misleading, although it 
ultimately ruled that the TTB’s COLA was dispositive.  Specifically, although the 
court decided that the label’s “handmade” claim was not misleading to the 
reasonable consumer,106 the claim that the vodka was made in an “old fashioned 
still” could be misleading and therefore was a genuine question of material fact 
that should survive a motion to dismiss.107  However, the court still found a safe 
harbor for FGI.  The plaintiffs argued that a safe harbor should not apply because 
of the “high levels of noncompliance found by the TTB during annual audits of 
labels in the industry” and because the system does not actually protect 
consumers.108  Yet the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ concerns:  “Even if this is so 
. . . [,] it would not matter. . . . The safe harbor applies.”  The court reasoned that 
Florida’s safe harbor statute protected “any act or practice required or specifically 
permitted by federal . . . law.  There is no exception for unwise or even 
incompetently enforced . . . laws.”109  Because the TTB is a “regulator charged 
[by Congress] with ensuring that representations on the Tito’s label are not 
misleading,” the court ruled that the TTB should be granted judicial deference, 
notwithstanding the concerns of the consumers or the questionable rigor of TTB 
label approval.110  Pye, then, gives the utmost deference to the TTB:  even if the 
TTB performs its job incompetently, it is not for the courts to intervene in TTB 
decisions. 
 
3. Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch (C.D. Cal.) 
 
Cruz and Parent make an important shift away from Aliano v. Fifth 
Generation and Pye:  they deferred to the TTB, but they do so only after making 
sure that the TTB’s grant of a COLA was supported by specific, clear, and 
thorough TTB regulations. 
In Cruz, the plaintiff complained that Anheuser-Busch (AB) misled 
customers by placing the Bud Light (emphasis added) logo on a case of Lime-R-
Rita cans, even though Lime-R-Rita was not, in fact, “low in calories and 
carbohydrates”; AB countered that TTB Ruling 2004-1 permitted the use of the 
word “light” so long as information on nutrition content was listed on the can, and 
not necessarily on the outer packaging.111  Although the Cruz court did rule that 
reasonable consumers would not be misled into believing that Lime-R-Ritas were 
“low in calories and carbohydrates,” it also ruled that safe harbor would have 
immunized AB’s conduct.112 
The court first recognized that, under Chevron and Mead, the judiciary 
should defer to the actions of a regulatory agency—in this case, the TTB—when 
 
106 The court reasoned that, because no reasonable consumer would actually believe that vodka is 
made without the aid of any machine whatsoever, the term “handmade” is mere “puffery” that is not 
actionable.  Pye v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 4:14cv493-RH/CAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128594, at *6 
(N.D. Fla., Sept. 23, 2015) . 
107 Id. at *7. 
108 Id. at *9. 
109 Id. at *9–10 (emphasis in the original) (internal citations omitted). 
110 Id. at *11. 
111 Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, No. CV 14-09670 AB (ASx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at 
*2–4, *13–14 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2015).  See also TTB RULING 2004-1, supra note 41. 
112 Cruz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at *19, *27. 
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it was clear that Congress’ intent was that the agency’s regulations have the force 
of law.  Following this logic, the court ruled that because Congress gave 
“preapproval authority to issue COLAs to endorse a label’s compliance with the 
FAA before the label is released to the public,” COLAs have the “exclusive effect 
of federal law.”113 
However, the court seemed comfortable deferring to the COLA because of 
the TTB’s specific process that went behind granting it.  The court noted that 
TTB Ruling 2004-1 specifically allowed AB to use the word “light” on its labels 
so long as nutrition information appeared either on the can or the outer 
packaging.114  The court emphasized that the TTB Ruling 2004-1 did not have the 
force of law; rather, it laid out one of the TTB’s requirements that producers must 
satisfy before receiving a COLA for their product label.  Importantly, the Cruz 
court found that the “COLA regulation is consistent with the statutory objective 
of the FAA” and that the COLA procedures are “relatively formal” enough to be 
entitled to judicial deference.115 
 
4. Parent v. MillerCoors (S.D. Cal.) 
 
The plaintiff of Parent complained that Blue Moon beer labels misleadingly 
implied that Blue Moon was a small-batch craft beer, when it fact it was produced 
by the popular big-beer producer MillerCoors.  The fraudulent claims, according 
to the plaintiff, were that Blue Moon was “artfully crafted” and that it was brewed 
by the “Blue Moon Brewing Company” (and not by MillerCoors).116  Blue Moon 
Brewing Company is not actually a producer of beer; rather, it is a fictitious 
business name owned by MillerCoors.117 
The court sided with MillerCoors but, significantly, did so only after 
distinguishing its case from Hofmann v. Fifth Generation.118  The Hofmann court 
refused to grant safe harbor to Tito’s Handmade Vodka because there was “no 
TTB regulation [that] specifically authorized the use of ‘homemade’ on the 
vodka’s label.”119  In Parent, on the other hand, the use of a trade name—“Blue 
Moon Brewing Company”—on a beer label was “specifically authorized by 
federal [TTB] and state regulations.”120  California has a rule permitting 
businesses to use fictitious business names as a trade name, and MillerCoors had 
duly registered its fictitious business name, Blue Moon Brewing Company, in 
California.121  Because the TTB had specific regulations on trade names 
appearing on labels, and because MillerCoors followed these regulations, the 
court was satisfied that the TTB’s process of granting a COLA in this case was 
 
113 Id., at *17–18. 
114 Id. at *17. 
115 Id. at *18–19. 
116 Parent v. MillerCoors, LLC., No. 3: 15-cv-1204-GPC-WVG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145071, at 
*2–4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015). 
117 Id. at *15. 
118 See Hofmann v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 14-cv-2569 JM (JLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157378 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015). 
119 Parent, No. 3:15-cv-1204-GPC-WVG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145071, at *16 (citing Hofmann, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157378, at *7). 
120 Id. at *15 (citing 27 C.F.R. §§ 25.142(a), 25.143(a) (2016)). 
121 Id. (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 130(a)). 
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thorough enough to give the COLA the effect of federal law.   
Interestingly, the court ruled that the “artfully crafted” claim was “mere 
puffery.”  Even though there is no TTB definition of “craft” or “craft beer,” the 
“artfully crafted” statement on the label was not “capable of being proved false or 
of being reasonably interpreted as a statement of objective fact”;122 it therefore 




We see, then, two sub-threads in the cases that defer to the TTB.  On one 
hand, Aliano v. Fifth Generation and Pye automatically defer to the TTB solely 
because it is a federal regulator, regardless of the process that goes behind 
approving labels; Pye in particular boldly states that whether an agency’s actions 
are right or incompetently performed is irrelevant, since a safe harbor should 
protect any federal agency action.123  On the other hand, Cruz and Parent defer to 
the TTB only when they are satisfied that the TTB has other specific regulations 
that support its decisions to grant COLAs. 
 
C. Cases Emphasizing the FAA Act’s Goal of Providing Accurate 
 Information to Consumers 
 
We now review another Anheuser-Busch case (Marty124), which assessed 
label claims implying that Beck’s Beer was brewed in Germany.  We also 
examine three spirits cases where the courts were not satisfied that the TTB 
ensured that the label information was accurate:  one involving Jim Beam 
Whiskey (Welk125), and two involving Tito’s Handmade Vodka again 
(Hofmann126 and Singleton127). 
 
1. Marty v. Anheuser-Busch (S.D. Fla.) 
 
Beck’s beer used to be produced in Germany, but after it was bought by 
Anheuser-Busch InBev (AB), its production for the U.S. market was moved in 
2012 to St. Louis, where AB brews Budweiser and its other beers.128  Yet AB still 
highlighted on the Beck’s labels its German origins:  the label indicates that the 
beer “Originated in Germany,” had “German Quality,” and was “Brewed Under 
the German Purity Law of 1516.”129  The plaintiff in Marty claimed that such 
claims misled consumers into believing that Beck’s was actually brewed in 
 
122 Id. at *23–25. 
123 Pye v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 4:14cv493-RH/CAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128594, at *9 
(N.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2015). 
124 Marty v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
125 Welk v. Beam Suntory Imp. Co., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1039 (S.D. Cal. 2015). 
126 Hofmann v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 14-cv-2569 JM (JLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157378 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015).  
127 Singleton v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-474 (BKS/TWD), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14000 
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016). 
128 Beck’s Beer Settlement, supra note 18. 
129 Marty, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1340. 
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Germany, using a German-specific process, with German ingredients.130  AB 
countered that the TTB approved the labels because the bottle label did state that 
the beer was a “Product of USA, Brauerei Beck & Co., St. Louis, MO,”131 albeit 
in a font that was extremely difficult to see. 
Ultimately, the court ruled that although the TTB approved Beck’s label, it 
would not defer to the label solely because the TTB approved it, since it found 
that AB still deceived consumers in advertising Beck’s as a German beer.  The 
court essentially gave four reasons.  First, it noted that although the TTB 
approved the label, the label that actually went on the bottle was different from 
the label that was submitted to the TTB:  the label that the TTB approved was 
printed on a gray, matte background, and so all the words could be easily seen, 
whereas the label that actually went on Beck’s bottle had several colors, such that 
“Product of USA” was no longer easily legible.132  Second, and related to the first 
point, the court noted that the “Product of USA” claim was difficult, almost 
impossible, to read:  it was miniscule, and it was printed in white font against a 
“shiny, metallic silver background” that made the font “obscured by overhead 
lighting.”133  Moreover, although AB placed the “Product of USA” disclaimer on 
the bottles, it did not do so on the outer packaging, and the court noted that a 
“reasonable consumer [should not be] required to open a carton or remove a 
product from its outer packaging in order to ascertain whether representations 
made on the face of the packaging are misleading.”134  Third, the court found that 
even if the “Product of USA, Brauerei Beck & Co., St. Louis, MO” disclaimer 
were legible, it did not sufficiently inform the customer that the product was 
brewed in America, since the disclaimer did not explicitly include the words 
“brewed at.”135  Finally, the court found that, the TTB’s label approval 
notwithstanding, AB’s other marketing campaigns, which suggested that Beck’s 
was brewed in Germany, misled consumers; and ruled that, even if there was a 
safe harbor for the label, there should be no safe harbor for non-label claims, 
since the TTB did not actually review them.136  The court, therefore, denied AB’s 
motion to dismiss, and the case eventually settled.137 
Marty, then, demonstrates a slight skepticism of the TTB:  unlike the Aliano 
v. Fifth Generation and Pye courts, Marty does not automatically imbue the 
TTB’s COLAs with the force of law.  Rather, it recognizes that the TTB is 
limited:  it cannot control the statements of breweries that are made outside of the 
labels, and it does not always police whether the approved label statements and 
fonts are the same as the statements and fonts that go on the bottle.  The Marty 





130 Id. at 1336. 
131 Id. at 1340. 
132 Id. at 1340–41. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1341. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 1345. 
137 Beck’s beer settlement, supra note 18. 
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2. Welk v. Beam Suntory (S.D. Cal.) 
 
Welk is similar to the Tito’s Vodka Cases in that the plaintiff in Welk argued 
that Jim Beam’s label, which stated that the bourbon is “handcrafted,” is 
misleading because the bourbon is actually made by a machine.138  The court 
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that no reasonable consumer would 
actually believe that a “handcrafted” claim “literally” meant that the bourbon 
production did not involve machines at all.139  However, the court did not dismiss 
the complaint without first discrediting the TTB’s COLA.  The court’s ruling on 
safe harbor is succinct and significant:  
 
Jim Beam argues that California’s safe harbor doctrine bars 
Welk’s suit because the TTB reviewed and pre-approved its 
labels to . . . [determine] whether the label is false and 
misleading.  But, the TTB certificates don’t reveal whether the 
TTB specifically investigated and approved the veracity of Jim 
Beam’s use of the term “handcrafted.” . . . Jim Beam’s motion 
to dismiss under the safe harbor doctrine is DENIED.140 
 
The Welk court refused to defer automatically to the TTB’s COLA just 
because it was a federal agency.  Rather, it expressed concern with whether the 
TTB was fulfilling its purpose of ensuring that the information on labels was 
accurate.141 
 
3. Hofmann v. Fifth Generation (S.D. Cal.)142 
 
FGI in Hofmann, likely relying on its successes in Aliano v. Fifth Generation, 
Pye, and Cruz, argued that the court should defer to the TTB since it was 
specifically authorized by Congress to grant COLAs; COLAs, FGI argued, should 
therefore have the “exclusive effect of federal law.”143  Hofmann, like the Aliano 
and Pye courts, recognized that Chevron demands that courts not intervene in 
agency action.  However, rather than stopping at Chevron, the court in Hofmann 
fleshed out the necessary requirements, laid out in subsequent cases, to trigger 
 
138 Welk v. Beam Suntory Imp. Co., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1040–41 (S.D. Cal. 2015). 
139 Id. at 1044. 
140 Id. at 1042 (emphasis added). 
141 Several other cases have expressed skepticism for the TTB’s COLAs when there was no proof that 
the TTB actually verified that the label information was accurate.  See Mariano Aliano & Due Fratelli, Inc. 
v. WhistlePig, LLC, No. 14 C 10148, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64401 at *26 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2015); 
Aliano v. Louisville Distilling Co., LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 921, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Nowrouzi v. Maker’s 
Mark Distillery, Inc., No. 14cv2885 JAH(NLS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97752 at *12 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 
2015). 
142 Hofmann’s sister case is Cabrera v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 14cv2990 JM(JLB), 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 157374 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015).  Cabrera is in the same court, before the same judge, with 
the same facts, was issued on the same date, and had substantially similar language as Hofmann—Cabrera 
just has a different plaintiff.  The cases were not officially consolidated.  For the purposes of this Note, 
therefore, I treat Cabrera and Hofmann the same. 
143 Hofmann v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 14-cv-2569 JM (JLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157378 at 
*15 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015) (citing Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, No. CV 14-09670 AB (ASx), 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at *18). 
2017 Mercurio: “Safe Harbor” on the Rocks 127 
Chevron deference.  It noted that Mead, a U.S. Supreme Court case, required 
relatively formal administrative procedures, such as general notice-and-comment 
practices, for agency action to have the effect of federal law, and importantly 
observed that “the sheer number of rulings [of certain agencies] undermines 
entitlement to Chevron deference.”144  It examined Walls, a Federal Circuit case, 
which claimed that a “formal administrative procedure” required “trial-type 
procedures,”145 and Reid, from the Ninth Circuit, which required strict 
administrative processes to trigger federal preemption.146  It also noted that, under 
the federal district court case Koenig, agency action that was unsupported by 
formal administrative processes should not trigger TTB deference or safe 
harbor.147 
In short, the Hofmann court recognized that the case law demanded that 
agency action be accompanied by formal administrative procedures before they 
can have the effect of federal law.  Hofmann was not satisfied with FGI’s naked 
claim that the TTB approved the Tito’s Handmade Vodka label.  It found no 
evidence that the TTB actually had regulations that supported its decision to 
approve Tito’s label.  It therefore denied FGI’s motion to dismiss the case so that 
the parties could proceed to discovery to determine whether Tito’s Vodka’s label 
claims were misleading or not. 
Interestingly, Hofmann, like the Parent court, considered what effect 
“puffery” had on safe harbor defenses, and ended up treating “puffery” in a 
completely different way from how Parent treated it.  In Parent, the court ruled 
that because claims that constituted “puffery” could not be objectively measured, 
plaintiffs could not base their claims on such statements.148  Hofmann shows the 
flip side of that argument:  because statements of “puffery” could not be 
objectively measured on whether they were accurate or not, they could not be 
assessed by the TTB, and therefore defendants could not raise the defense that the 
TTB approved such statements.149  The way Hofmann understands “puffery” 
demonstrates that it distrusts the TTB’s label approval process and discourages 
alcoholic beverage producers from relying on the TTB’s approval. 
 
4. Singleton v. Fifth Generation (N.D.N.Y.) 
 
Singleton complements Hofmann:  Hofmann has an in-depth discussion of 
when courts should and should not apply Chevron deference to federal agencies, 
whereas Singleton paints a broad picture of current case law and reassesses the 
primary purpose of the FAA Act.  Just like the previous Tito’s Vodka cases, FGI 
in Singleton argued that courts should not “second-guess the TTB’s determination 
to issue the COLAs” and that the TTB’s determination created safe harbor for 
FGI, and furthermore alleged that COLAs should not be revoked by courts 
 
144 Id. at *21 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218–22 (2001)). 
145 Id. at *19 (citing Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
146 Id. at *10–11 (citing Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
147 Id. at *18–19 (citing Von Koenig v. Snapple Bev. Co., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070–76 (E.D. Cal. 
2010)). 
148 Parent v. MillerCoors LLC, No. 3:15-cv-1204-GPC-WVG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145071, at 
*23–25 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015). 
149 Hofmann, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157378 at *19–21. 
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because they are “protected property interests.”150  The plaintiff, as in FGI’s 
previous cases, argued that FGI’s conduct should not trigger safe harbor “because 
no federal or state law or regulation specifically permits [FGI] to deceptively 
label its vodka as ‘Handmade’”151—in other words, that the TTB’s COLAs did 
not have the effect of federal law.  The plaintiff further alleged that the COLA 
“simply demonstrates that the TTB took [FGI]’s word at face value, but does not 
suggest that the TTB knew the process by which Tito’s was actually made or that 
the TTB ever conducted an investigation to verify Tito’s representations.”152 
Singleton reviewed several cases on both sides of the issue.  It noted that 
Cruz, Aliano v. Fifth Generation, and Pye153 deferred to the TTB but also 
observed the significant case law—namely, Hofmann, Aliano v. WhistlePig, 
Aliano v. Louisville Distilling, and Nowrouzi154—that refused to defer to the 
TTB’s label approval when it was not clear that the TTB actually verified the 
claims on the label as true and accurate.155  To help tip the balance of the cases, 
Singleton looked at safe harbor cases outside of the TTB labeling context and 
ultimately found that a safe harbor “has been applied [only] where a federal law 
or regulation specifically authorizes the challenged conduct, or a federal agency 
specifically approves the challenged conduct.”156 
Ultimately, Singleton concluded that New York’s safe harbor statute should 
apply only when the TTB has specific regulations that supports its decisions to 
grant COLAs:  “[t]he record does not reflect whether the TTB investigated or 
ruled upon the representations that Tito’s vodka is ‘handmade’ and ‘crafted in an 
old-fashioned pot still.’”157  Moreover, the court took issue with the fact that the 
TTB approved the label claims even though the TTB had no specific regulations 
on what “handmade” or “crafted in an old-fashioned pot still” meant.  It 
contrasted the TTB’s lack of regulations on the word “handmade” in this case to 
the presence of an actual TTB regulation in Cruz, where the court allowed 
Anheuser-Busch to place the word “light” on its bottles because it specifically 
complied with TTB Ruling 2004-1.158  The Singleton further contrasted the 
 
150 Singleton v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-474 (BKS/TWD), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14000, 
at *16 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016).  
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 See Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027 (C.D. Cal., June 3, 2015); 
Aliano v. Fifth Generation, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128104 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 24, 2015); Pye v. Fifth 
Generation, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128594 (N.D. Fla., Sept. 23, 2015). 
154 See Hofmann v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 14-cv-2569 JM (JLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157378 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015); Mariano Aliano & Due Fratelli, Inc. v. WhistlePig, LLC, No. 14 C 10148, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64401 at *18 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2015); Aliano v. Louisville Distilling Co., LLC, 115 F. 
Supp. 3d 921, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Nowrouzi v. Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc., No. 14cv2885 JAH(NLS), 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97752 at *12 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2015). 
155 Singleton, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14000 at *16–23. 
156 Id. at *23 (emphasis added) (citing L. Offs. of K.C. Okoli, P.C. v. BNB Bank, N.A., 481 F.App’x 
622, 624–26 (2d Cir. 2012)) (finding safe harbor when there were banking “regulations directly on point”); 
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 672 F. Supp. 135, 144–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying safe 
harbor when “allegedly misleading drug warning labels complied with specific warning requirements 
issued by the Food and Drug Administration”); Mendelson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 466 N.Y.S.2d 
168, 170 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (safe harbor “barred claims related to overbooking airline flights when a 
regulation specifically permitted the practice”)). 
157 Id. at *24. 
158 Id. at *25 (citing Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at *13–14 (C.D. 
Cal., June 3, 2015)). 
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TTB’s lack of regulations for the term “handmade” with its specific regulations 
governing the term “gluten-free” or the term “organic” on products’ labels.159  
Singleton ultimately proposed that when the TTB lacks specific regulations on a 
particular term on a label, courts should resist deferring to TTB action just 
because the TTB is a federal agency.  Singleton, then, dismissed FGI’s safe 
harbor defense in its motion to dismiss and ordered the parties to proceed to the 
discovery phase to determine whether FGI’s claims were, in fact, misleading.160 
Most significantly, Singleton reminds us that the TTB’s actions should not be 
given the force of law when the TTB has failed to fulfill the purpose of the FAA 
Act.  The TTB derives its authority from the FAA Act, and the FAA Act 
“prohibits false and misleading labeling”; therefore, when TTB label approval 
and the FAA Act’s purpose appear to conflict, the “TTB approval is not intended 




The four cases we just reviewed demonstrate varying levels of skepticism of 
the TTB’s label approval process.  Marty is the least skeptical:  it does not 
question the rigor of the label approval process, but rather notes that producers 
will lose their protection if they use labels whose fonts are different from those 
they submit to the TTB, and that producers’ statements on websites and extra-
label advertising will not be protected by COLAs.  Welk, Hofmann, and 
Singleton, on the other hand, openly doubt that the grant of a COLA 
automatically means that the TTB has actually certified that label statements are 
accurate and true.  Those courts prefer to let the cases go to discovery, so that a 
trial could determine whether a reasonable consumer could be misled by a label’s 
statements or not.  Indeed, Singleton even questions whether the TTB’s label 
approval process complies with the purposes of the FAA Act at all and 




III. TAKING A SHOT (AT SOME PRACTICAL THOUGHTS AND SOLUTIONS) 
 
A. The Courts are Split, but Who is Right? 
 
We have seen how the tension between the TTB’s identity as a federal 
agency on one hand and the TTB’s purpose of providing consumers with accurate 
 
159 Id. at *24–25 (citing 27 C.F.R. §5.71(b)).   
160 Id. at *26.  The court cites several other cases that denied the safe harbor defense and ordered the 
case to move forward into the discovery phase.  See In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., No. 12-MD-2413 
(RRM)(RLM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123824 at *68–69 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013) (“declining to dismiss 
a . . . claim based on safe harbor where . . . it was not clear that defendant’s labeling complied with FDA 
guidance”); Frey v. Bekins Van Lines, Inc., 748 F.Supp.2d 176, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that ruling as 
to applicability of safe harbor was “completely premature” at motion to dismiss stage); Banks v. Consumer 
Home Mortg., Inc., No. 01-CV-8508 (ILG), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8230 at *41 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2003) 
(“safe harbor defense based on disputed compliance with regulations would have to await the completion of 
discovery”). 
161 Singleton, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14000 at *25–26. 
130 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 7:2 
information on the other hand has created a judicial split, with half of the courts 
siding with producers and the TTB and the other half refusing to defer to the TTB 
in order to provide adequate information to consumers.  The TTB makes 
determinations and issues rulings, but some courts are reluctant to give the force 
of law to such determinations and rulings when they apparently come in conflict 
with the original purpose of the FAA Act—which is to protect consumers from 
misinformation. 
So who is right?  Both sides of the debate have legitimate concerns.  On one 
hand, deferring to the TTB seems to help preserve the distinction between the 
judicial and legislative branch.  According to this view, the judiciary should apply 
federal rules and regulations to cases, not to question the rules’ legitimacy or, 
worse, create their own rules.  Courts should refrain from second-guessing these 
laws and regulations because it is Congress’ role to legislate, a role which 
Congress can delegate to a regulatory agency if it so wishes.162  In fact, the states’ 
safe harbor laws were created for the purpose of preventing the judiciary from 
legislating from the bench.  The California Supreme Court eloquently addressed 
these concerns in Cel-Tech Communications:  
 
Courts may not simply impose their own notions of the day as to 
what is fair or unfair.  Specific legislation may limit the 
judiciary’s power to declare conduct unfair.  If the Legislature 
has permitted certain conduct or considered a situation and 
concluded no action should lie, courts may not override that 
determination.163 
 
Safe harbors assure that courts uphold federal legislation and regulation—
regardless of “[w]hether or not [the courts] agree with” the rules at hand.164  
Indeed, some courts are so concerned about legislating from the bench that they—
as epitomized by Pye—have ruled that the judiciary should defer to “any” act 
permitted by federal agencies, without any “exception for unwise or even 
incompetently enforced . . . laws.”165 
 Other courts are not so sure that their hands are tied just because the TTB is 
a federal regulatory agency.  Cruz and Parent, for example, have required 
something more than just a COLA to defer to the TTB’s approval of a label—
namely, they have required specific TTB Rulings or regulations that actually 
support the TTB’s decision to allow the use of a certain term on a label.  Without 
specific rulings or regulations backing a COLA, courts cannot be sure that the 
TTB actually took steps to verify that the information on a label was accurate or, 
at the very least, not misleading.  This was the case in Welk, Hofmann, and 
Singleton, and also in Aliano v. WhistlePig, Aliano v. Louisville Distilling, and 
 
162 In re Anhesuer-Busch Beer Labeling Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 1:13 MD 2448, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 76005, at *36 (N.D. Oh. June 2, 2014) (“Congress entrusted the TTB with broad discretion in 
this area and courts should be extremely reluctant to invalidate a policy determination.”). 
163 Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 973 P.2d 527, 541 (Cal. 
1999) (emphasis added). 
164 In re Anheuser-Busch Litigation, 2014 U.S. District LEXIS 76005, at *36. 
165 Pye v. Fifth Generation, Inc., No. 4:14cv493-RH/CAS,2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128594, at *9–10 
(N.D. Fla., Sept. 23, 2015). 
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Nowrouzi. 
These courts ultimately refuse to defer to the TTB’s COLAs not because they 
want to create their own legislation.  Rather, these courts refuse to defer 
automatically to the TTB’s unsupported, naked actions because they want to 
make sure that the intent of the original legislation—the FAA Act—is realized.  
As Singleton observed, the FAA Act is where the TTB derives its authority, and 
therefore it is the intent of the FAA Act which the courts should uphold—not the 
arbitrary determinations of the TTB.166 
Indeed, as a practical matter, it is nearly impossible for the TTB to regulate 
every word, term, phrase, or image that could go on a label, and the TTB has to 
examine hundreds of thousands of labels each year—so much that it is reasonable 
to surmise that the TTB cannot and does not ensure that each piece of information 
on the label is in compliance with the FAA.  In such a system, where the TTB is 
likely overburdened, consumers—who have to rely on products’ label statements 
to determine if they will buy a product or not—are the victims.  Protecting these 
consumers is the very reason that the FAA Act was passed and the TTB was 
created.  When the TTB fails to protect these consumers, courts should be ready 
to strike down those TTB determinations which do not put into effect the FAA 
Act’s purpose. 
 
B. Practical Steps for the TTB and Producers 
 
What of the TTB and producers?  Asking the TTB to change and institute 
even more regulations and a more rigorous label review process would seem to 
help protect against consumer deception, which is what the FAA Act intended in 
the first place.  However, doing so seems for the moment to be impractical.  The 
TTB seems overwhelmed with the number of labels it has to review each year as 
it is,167 and the rapidly growing alcoholic beverage industry is only going to 
exacerbate the problem unless Congress drastically increases TTB resources and 
funding.  Furthermore, requiring the TTB to assess every statement, including 
brand names, for example, might push the TTB into the domain of the USPTO, 
which has a more rigorous trademark application process.  At this juncture, the 
most the TTB might be expected to do is to include a disclaimer for its COLAs 
indicating that, unless there are specific TTB regulations that authorize the use of 
certain terms of labels, merely having a COLA does not immunize producers 
from lawsuits alleging customer deception. 
The players in the industry who can most readily change their conduct are the 
producers themselves.  They know now from the judicial split on safe harbor that 
a TTB’s COLA alone does not automatically protect their labels, and indeed, the 
new Congress may very well abolish judicial deference to the TTB.168  Rather, 
courts typically will defer to the TTB’s COLAs only if they are supported by 
specific rules and regulations promulgated by the TTB.  Producers, therefore, can 
use the terms “light” or “gluten-free” on their labels, because the TTB has 
 
166 Singleton, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14000, at *25–26. 
167 Kanach & Christopherson, supra note 7. 
168 Macagnone, supra note 56. 
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specific rulings and regulations permitting their use (so long, of course, that the 
producers comply with those regulations).169 
This does not mean that COLAs have no worth to producers—producers still 
need them if they are going to sell their products across state lines.  It just means 
that producers can no longer raise the COLAs as a defense against claims of 
deception on their labels (or in their other non-label advertising and marketing, 
such as on the product websites).  It also means that producers should take a hard 
look at all their labels and make sure that reasonable consumers would not 
construe the statements on them as misleading. 
The case law suggests other practical tips as well:  Marty, in particular, tells 
producers that the label font and colors they submit to the TTB should be exactly 
the same as the label they put on the bottle, that disclaimers should be placed on 
both the bottle or can and the outer packaging, and that the production source 
should be specifically indicated with the words “brewed at.”170  What is most 
important, however, is that producers thoughtfully assess what goes on the labels 
and what does not, especially if the TTB lacks regulations on the terms the 
producer wants to use.  If the producers do so, then not only will the FAA Act’s 
purpose of providing accurate information to consumers be achieved, but 
producers will be protecting themselves from lawsuits in ways that an 
unsupported TTB COLA never could. 
 
 
LAST CALL: CONCLUSION 
 
 
Beer, wine, and spirits are growing in America, and producers are trying to 
file every necessary federal application—including to the TTB and USPTO—to 
sell and protect their product.  However, as Tony Magee observed on Twitter, 
trademark protections offered by the USPTO have limits.171  And as we have seen 
in this Note, so do the COLA protections offered by the TTB.  Every alcoholic 
beverage producer, if they want to sell in interstate commerce, must have their 
labels approved by the TTB.  With the growing number of applications, however, 
it is near-impossible for the TTB to have regulations on every term that goes on 
labels or to verify as accurate every statement on every label.  It creates a system 
where the purpose of the FAA Act and the TTB—to provide accurate information 
to consumers before they purchase alcoholic beverage products—is not being 
realized.  It is the reason that a growing number of courts refuse to grant a safe 
harbor to producers just because the TTB is a federal agency. 
Importantly, when Tony Magee claimed on Twitter that “our TM has limits,” 
he said so not because the USPTO or the judiciary told him so.172  He said so 
because he went to the “ultimate Court”—the “Court of Public Opinion.”173  That 
 
169 Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC, No. CV 14-09670 AB (ASx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76027, at 
*13–14 (C.D. Cal., June 3, 2015); TTB RULING 2004-1, supra note 41.  Singleton, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14000, at *24–25. 
170 Marty v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1340–41 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
171 Magee Twitter, supra note 1. 
172 Id. 
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is a lesson that can be adopted by the TTB and producers when it comes to 
COLAs and safe harbor.  Ultimately, the purpose of the FAA Act is to serve the 
public—to help inform the public of plethora of products in the beer, wine, and 
spirits industry.  When the public is informed, the public can make choices and 
purchases that help the alcoholic beverage industry thrive even more.  We are in a 
“golden age” of beer, wine, and spirits,174 and when the courts, the TTB, the 
producers, and the public ensure that the purpose of the FAA Act is being 
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